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On February 9, 2009, Mr. Dean G. Popps, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Acquisition, Logistics, Technology), issued a memorandum directing that all first article 
and lot acceptance testing of interceptor body armor (IBA) would be conducted by the 
Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). Prior to the directive, the majority of IBA 
testing was conducted at National Institute of Justice (NIJ)-certified ballistics 
laboratories. The rationale for this change, as stated in the memorandum, was that recent 
internal and external reviews indicate that the testing process for personal protective 
equipment needed to be improved. This joint applied project examines the reasons why 
the decision was made, as articulated in the Popps memorandum, what improvements to 
IBA testing were made by ATEC, and impacts of the changes, positive and negative. 
Although the scope of the project is limited to IBA hard armor ballistic inserts, the goal is 
to provide the current and future leadership of Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier 
and other stakeholders a better understanding of key events and decisions regarding body 
armor testing and the impacts of those events and decisions, to inform future decisions. 
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report, Review of Body 
Armor (GAO-07-662R) on April 26, 2007. The subject of the report as stated is Defense 
Logistics: Army and Marine Corps’s Individual Body Armor Issues. Enclosure I, slide 5 
of this document provides a good synopsis of the concerns over body armor from 2005–
2007. The concerns were as follows: 
 In February 2005, an Armed Forces Institute of Pathology report 
found that body armor did not provide side protection. 
 In April 2005, GAO reported that there were shortages in body 
armor due to material shortages, production limitations, and in-
theater distribution problems. 
 In May 2005, Marine Corps recalled body armor because it 
concluded that the fielded body armor failed to meet contract 
specifications; public concern raised. 
 In November 2005, Army and Marine Corps recalled 14 lots of 
body armor that failed original ballistic testing, but were accepted 
by DOD. 
 In January 2006, a New York Times article reported on the Institute 
of Pathology report and the recalls, raising public concern again.  
 Congress has expressed strong interest in assuring body armor 
protects ground troops including the amount and level of ballistic 
protection, testing of body armor before and after fielding, and 
coordination of requirements and testing between the Army and 
Marine Corps. 
 GAO has conducted prior and ongoing work concerning force 
protection for ground forces, including truck armor to protect 
forces from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
 GAO began a review of body armor as part of its review of 
protection of ground forces. (Solis, 2007, pp. 5–6) 
The New York Times article referenced above and written by Michael Moss is 
titled, “Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor” (Moss, 2006). A similar article 
 2
was published on the same day in another major newspaper, The Washington Post, 
written by Ann Scott Tyson. The title was a better description of the issue at hand, 
“Body-Armor Gaps Are Shown to Endanger Troops” (Tyson, 2006). The issue was that 
gaps in hard armor plate coverage and soft armor coverage of certain extremities resulted 
in lethal torso wounds that may have been preventable with additional coverage. These 
gaps ultimately resulted in side hard armor plates and additional soft armor protection for 
the neck and shoulders.  
Shortly after the release of the GAO report, NBC News commissioned a private 
ballistics laboratory in Germany, Beschussamt Mellrichstadt, to do a comparative test 
between the Army’s interceptor body armor (IBA) system, and a commercial body armor 
called Dragon Skin. The test was conducted on May 3, 2007, and was the subject of a 
Dateline NBC report that aired on May 20, 2007. The report received a great deal of 
attention from the public, media, and eventually Congress. The results of the test seemed 
to confirm that Dragon Skin flexible body armor provided superior ballistic protection 
compared to the Army and Marine Corps issued IBA.  
The Dateline NBC report, subsequent Army responses, and resulting 
Congressional hearings are what ultimately led to Mr. Dean G. Popps, the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, Technology), to issue a 
memorandum directing that all first article test (FAT) and lot acceptance testing (LAT) of 
interceptor body armor (IBA) would be conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation 
Command (ATEC).  
B. PURPOSE 
The section entitled Body Armor and Rifles Remain a Popular Media Topic, in 
the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier FY09 historical report, states: 
Because these items represent a Soldiers two most important actions; 
offense and defense, they remain, in BG Fuller’s words, “lightning rods” 
of media and public attention. For as long as American Soldiers will go in 
harm’s way, the Army should get in front of the certain bow wave of press 
reports finding fault with acquisition of these items. (Sahlin, 2010, p. 6) 
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This statement is as true today for body armor as it was in 2009, and no doubt 
remains that it will continue to be true into the future.  
The purpose of this research effort is to provide analysis and insight for the 
current and future leadership of PEO Soldier and other stakeholder organizations to assist 
in future decision making regarding the test and evaluation of body armor. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this joint applied project is what are the 
impacts, positive and negative, of the decision to conduct IBA hard armor ballistic insert 
testing through the ATEC? 
The following subsidiary research questions are also addressed: 
 What were the reasons for the decision to conduct all IBA hard armor 
ballistic insert testing through ATEC versus National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) certified laboratories? 
 Who were important stakeholders in the decision-making process, and 
what did they have at stake regarding this decision? 
 What was the cost of FAT and LAT testing at the NIJ laboratories 
compared to the cost of testing at ATEC? 
 What improvements to body armor testing and unintended consequences 
emerged in the years following the Popps memorandum? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this research effort is limited to published works and documented 
meetings and events. Body armor testing in the United States (U.S.) Army is still an 
emotional subject for many in the materiel development and test communities. This 
research effort examines the larger issues, and provides objective analysis. The scope is 
also limited to hard armor ballistic testing to provide context in answering the research 
questions. Body armor testing is a complicated process, and therein lies much of the 
problem. It is difficult to distill the processes and associated disciplines, such as ballistics, 
to a level easily understood by those without training and experience in these areas. 
Limiting the technical scope of research accomplishes the purpose without 
overcomplicating the material, and overwhelming the reader with technical detail. 
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Additionally, to avoid potentially sensitive and/or classified material, this research 
effort limits the discussion of specific methodologies and requirements, both test and 
material, to overview for general understanding and context. In certain instances, test and 
material requirements require closer examination, as they play a key role in answering the 
research questions, and subsequent conclusions. In those instances, sensitive and/or 
classified aspects are not included. 
 5
II. IBA BALLISTIC INSERT TEST OVERVIEW 
A. GENERAL 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a sense of the technical 
complexity of testing body armor. A test operating procedure (TOP) governs the live-fire 
testing of IBA ballistic inserts for use by the United States Army and Marine Corps. 
TOPs are frequently updated to account for procedural changes related to issues that have 
occurred during testing, the introduction of new test technology (such as fixtures and 
instrumentation), and new discoveries resulting from previous testing. For the purposes 
of this research, the TOP referenced in describing hard armor test is U.S. Army 
Developmental Test Command TOP 10-2-210, dated October 1, 2008—Change 4 with 
multiple update pages (May 21, 2009, June 16, 2009, September 10, 2009, and April 21, 
2010). This document governed hard armor testing during the formative period of 
transition to testing all body armor at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC). This TOP was not 
published until after the first directed test of body armor at ATEC. 
Live-fire body armor testing is conducted on the Light Armor Range Complex 
(LARC) at ATC. All the major components (hard armor, soft armor, and helmets) of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) are tested at this location using separate ranges 
outfitted with fixtures and instrumentation specific to the item being tested.  
B. REQUIRED TEST CONDITIONS 
The required test conditions for hard armor ballistic inserts are described in TOP 
10-2-210 (U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, 2008) [redacted where necessary and 
paragraphs deleted for brevity]: 
3.3 Test Set-Up.  
A typical test set-up is shown in Figure 1. Equipment includes the 
following: 1) a stripper plate to keep sabot petals away from the target 
and/or instrumentation if required; 2) Doppler radar or velocity screens to 
measure the penetrator striking velocity; 3) a yaw card or orthogonal high 
speed video cameras to check the striking yaw of the penetrator; 4) 
witness plates to identify spall coming off the front of the armor target. 
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Approved calibration procedures and standards will be used for a 
instrumentation and documented as part of the test record. Any test shot 
for which yaw is determined to be greater than 3 degrees will be scored as 
an unfair hit (results excluded for analysis) and shall be identified as such 
in the database. Air drag correction calculations will be used to calculate 
the final striking velocities. 
3.3.1 Range Preparation. 
Test equipment will be arranged per Figure 1, with the test sample 
mounted [redacted] m from the test barrel being used to fire test rounds. 
The distance may need to be adjusted for different threat rounds to 
minimize the possibility of excessive yaw at impact or to achieve desired 
impact location accuracies. 
Figure 1.  Typical Indoor Range Setup for Body Armor V50/V0 Testing 
 
 
3.3.2 Test Target Fixture. 
The clay backing material, upon which the test sample will be mounted, 
will be contained by a rigid (i.e. metal) frame with wood backing. The 
clay backing material packed into the rigid frame with wood backing 
forms the clay backing block which must be firmly held in place by a 
suitable test stand. The test stand should several locking degrees of 
freedom that would allow the clay backing block (with attached target) to 
be shifted vertically / horizontally such that the entire assembly is within 






3.3.3 Target Obliquity. 
The obliquity of the target relative to projectile line of flight shall be set at 
the required obliquity [with redacted degree of accuracy]. 
3.3.4 Test Projectiles. 
Threat projectiles, as specified in the governing requirements 
documentation, will be hand loaded into cartridges by a qualified 
ammunition loader during testing. Propellant must be carefully measured 
and hand-loaded to ensure test rounds fired achieve the desired velocity 
[redacted] for V50 testing. For V0 testing the test rounds shall achieve the 
required reference velocity [redacted] for the specific threat projectiles 
being fired as specified in the governing requirements documentation.  
Note: Experience has shown that controlling humidity in the ammunition 
loading facility is essential for maintaining desired projectile impact 
velocities. 
3.3.5 Test Barrels. 
Test barrels used to fire the test rounds shall be ANSI/SAAMI unvented 
velocity test barrels. 
3.3.6 Test Barrel Fixtures. 
The test barrel fixture used to fire test rounds shall be an ANSI/SAAMI 
Universal Receiver or similar. The fixture shall be attached to a table or 
other fixture, with the capability to adjust elevation, with sufficient 
restraint and mass to ensure accurate targeting for repetitive firing of 
rounds. 
3.3.7 Velocity Management. 
Two independent sets of instrumentation are required for velocity 
management. Examples of acceptable types of instrumentation for velocity 
management include photo electric light screens, ballistic radar, printed 
make circuit screens, and printed break circuit screens. Fair velocity 
measurements are individual measurements within [redacted] of each 
other. Recorded velocity shall be the arithmetic mean of all fair velocity 
measurements. If chronographs are used with trigger screens, the screens 
should be centered at [redacted] in front of the armor test sample mounting 
fixture. Screens must be securely mounted to maintain required position 
and spacing. Prior to the star of testing, sufficient time must be allowed for 
instrumentation to warm-up and achieve stability. When using velocity 
screens to measure striking velocity, two pairs of screens are used in a 
double-base configuration. This configuration provides redundant 
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measurements at the same pint along the trajectory of the projectile. 
Instrument velocity measurements will be translated into striking velocity 
at the target in accordance with procedures set forth in the International 
Test Operations Procedure (ITOP 4-2-805). Figure 2 provides an example 
of a typical velocity measurement set-up when velocity screens are used. 
Note: The velocity screen set-up in Figure 2 is a compromise (from longer 
distances between velocity screens) to balance velocity measurement 
accuracy with the need to keep gun muzzle to target distance short enough 
to achieve adequate shot impact location accuracy. 
Figure 2.  Typical Velocity Measurement Set-up  
(when velocity screens are used) 
 
3.4 Fluid Conditioning. [Redacted] 
3.5 Threat Munitions. 
Test samples will be subjected to threat munitions as specified in the 
governing requirement document (e.g., purchase description, or system 
specification as applicable). (U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, 
pp. 3–6) 
C. PREPARATIONS FOR TEST EXECUTION 
Preparations for test execution on hard armor ballistic inserts are described in 
TOP 10-2-210 [redacted where necessary and paragraphs deleted for brevity]: 
3.6 Preparations for Execution. 
3.6.1 Velocity Curve. 
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Prior to testing body armor, a propellant charge versus velocity curve shall 
be established for the combination of threat projectile, barrel, shell casing, 
and propellant being used. The required velocity shall be within a 
tolerance level of [redacted]. Prior to the start of record V0 test firing, at 
least three warm-up rounds will be fired to verify the striking velocity is 
stabilized within [redacted] of the reference velocity for specific threat 
projectiles being fired as specified in the governing requirements 
documentation. Warm-up rounds also confirm impacts are placed 
accurately enough to provide fair hit locations (see paragraph 4.6) in 
accordance with the specific test requirements. If there is a pause in testing 
of more than one hour, additional warm-up rounds will be fired prior to 
continuing the ballistic test record shots on body armor test samples. 
3.6.2 Clay Backing. 
a. Clay Backing Block. The back of the armor test specimen will be placed 
against a block of non-hardening, oil based modeling clay [specific type 
redacted]. The clay material will be in the form of a single block 
measuring [redacted] in length and width, with a depth of [redacted]. A 
rigid (i.e., metal) frame will be used to hold the clay and it will have 
[redacted] removable wood or plywood backing. [Redacted] clay come in 
bricks of [redacted] each. It requires approximately [redacted] bricks to fill 
a [redacted] rigid frame. An aluminum frame with the plywood backing 
weighs approximately [redacted] without the clay and approximately 
[redacted] with the clay. 
b. Preparation of the Clay Backing Block. The clay bricks must be worked 
thoroughly to remove any voids to form one solid block with a smooth, 
flat front surface for accurate and consistent measurement of depression 
depths. After the clay has been worked into the rigid frame, the clay 
backing block shall be X-rayed to verify that no voids exist. The front 
surface of the clay must be even with the reference surface plane defined 
by the front edges of the rigid frame to obtain an original flat surface with 
a [redacted] clay depth. Leveling devices of sufficient length shall be used 
to ensure the reference surface is established using the edges of the clay 
box frame as index points. Figure 3 illustrates the process described here. 
Note: Forming the clay into the rigid frame is easier if the clay is heat 
conditioned. A pneumatic or electric tamper may be used to condition the 
new clay when it is placed in the rigid frame. The clay shall be replaced at 
least annually or as required if spall becomes embedded in the clay or a 





c. Preparation of Additional Clay Backing for Non-Planar Body Armor. 
(1) For non-planar body armor (i.e. curved rigid plates) that do not make 
full contact with the flat clay surface, additional clay backing material 
shall be built up on the front surface of the clay block to conform to the 
shape of the non-planar armor. The added clay shall be conditioned at the 
same temperature as the clay backing material used in the clay block. 
Molds are used to shape the clay used for the built-up area on the front of 
the clay block (the area under the curved ceramic armor plate). The 
curvature of the molds match the dimensions specified in the reference 
drawings contained in the body armor purchase descriptions. Temperature 
conditioned clay is placed in the mold cavity and tamped as the mold is 
filled to remove any voids and to form one solid block of clay. Once the 
mold is filled, a taught wire on a low frame is used to cut the clay even 
with the top surface of the mold. 
Figure 3.  Process Used to Prepare the Clay Backing Pack 
  
 
Any significant voids/tears at the cut clay surface are filled and a taught 
wire is used again to cut eh clay even with the top surface of the mold. 
The clay form is then removed from the mold. 
(2) The ceramic armor test plate is now placed into the empty mold cavity 
and a flat metal plate is placed on the ceramic armor plate such that the 
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metal plate touches the corners of the ceramic armor plate. Next, guide 
plates attached to the mold sides are raised until they are in contact with 
the metal plate on top of the ceramic armor plate, and the guide plates are 
locked in place. The edges of the guide plates now establish a plane 
[redacted] above the corners of the ceramic armor plate. At this point the 
flat metal plate is removed, and the curved clay form is placed against the 
rear surface of the ceramic armor plate and rolled to press the clay firmly 
against the ceramic armor plate. The edges of the clay form are now 
trimmed flush with the edges of the ceramic armor plate. The taught wire 
is then drawn across the guide plates on the mold to cut the clay form at 
the proper thickness. The clay form is now custom fitted for that specific 
ceramic armor panel, and is removed for temperature conditioning as 
necessary. 
(3) The process for mounting the clay form to the clay backing block starts 
by pressing one edge of the flat side of the clay form against the front side 
of the flat clay block. The clay form is then laid out against the clay block 
(in a forward rolling motion), with the clay form being pressed against the 
clay block as contact between the two occurs. This is done after the clay 
block has passed the drop test trials that confirm the clay consistency (see 
discussion in the paragraph e. below). A thin strip of temperature 
conditioned clay material is then pressed along the edge of the curved clay 
form at the surface of the flat clay backing pack to reinforce the joint area. 
At this point the clay backing is ready for the body armor to be mounted 
for ballistic testing. 
d. Clay Conditioning. The clay will be placed in the rigid frame and 
worked thoroughly to remove any voids prior to being placed in the 
conditioning chamber. The clay backing block for each test will have been 
conditioned at a uniform temperature to enable the clay to pass the drop 
test. Additional clay material will be simultaneously conditioned for use in 
filling depressions created by the drop testing and building up areas to fit 
non-planar body armor test samples. An alternate conditioning method 
that may be used in conjunction with temperature adjustment is cold 
working. During cold work, mechanical energy is imparted to the clay by 
some means (i.e. a pneumatic tamper, a mallet). This will soften the clay 
in order to allow it to pass the drop calibration test. 
e. Clay Consistency Measurement. The consistency of the clay backing 
material will be measured via a drop test prior to using the clay block for a 
sequence of ballistic tests. Unless otherwise specified differently in the 
governing system requirements documentation, the clay consistency shall 
be such that a depression of [redacted] in depth is obtained when a 
[redacted] cylindrical steel mass (see Figure 4.), [redacted] in diameter and 
having a hemispherical striking end, is dropped from a height of [redacted] 
onto the flat clay surface. A guide tube or other means may be used as 
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required to assure that the striking end of the cylindrical mass impacts the 
backing material squarely (see Figure 5.). Three or more individual drop 
trials (example show in Figure 6.) shall be executed. The edge of each 
dimple created by the impact shall be at least [redacted] from an edge and 
the distances between impact dimple centers shall be at least [redacted.] 
Drop test impact locations should not be near planned test shot impact 
locations. The depressions will be measured using the original flat surface 
as measurement reference with a device capable of [redacted] accuracy, 
using a bridge that rests on two parallel sides of the clay backing block 
rigid frame. Each drop test depression is required to meet the [redacted] 
depth criteria. Before each measurement, the measuring device will be 
zeroed using the edge of the rigid frame to reference the original flat 
surface of the clay. The drop test indentations will be filled with 
temperature conditioned clay prior to use of the clay block for ballistic 
tests. In the event the clay backing material drop test results do not meet 
the depression depth criteria, the clay backing shall be repaired with 
temperature conditioned clay and the drop trials shall be repeated after 
adequate reconditioning of the clay backing block. For example, if the 
failure of the drop test was due to one or more shallow depressions, then 
clay backing block should be heated uniformly, or cold worked, or some 
combination of the two methods. On the other hand, if the clay drop test 
failure occurred due to one or more deep depressions, the clay backing 
block should be allowed to cool uniformly. If, after reconditioning, the 
clay backing does not meet the drop test depression criteria on the second 
attempt, the clay backing shall be replaced with another clay backing 
block and the clay consistency measurement process shall be repeated. 
Measurement of clay consistency is not required again post-test; however, 
a 45-minute time limit will be imposed on the use of the clay block staring 
form the impact of the last passing pre-test drop until the impact of the last 
record projectile against the armor under test. 
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Figure 4.  Cylindrical Steel Mass Used for Drop Tests on Clay 
 




Figure 6.  Typical Drop Test Indentation Pattern in Clay Backing Material 
 
 
3.6.3 Test Sample Accountability. 
All test samples will be documented in an armor custody tracking system, 
which will be updated on an as needed basis. This system will provide 
documentation accurately tracking the location of all test samples from the 
time of receipt until final disposition. The armor custody tracking system 
will also document the manufacturer and configuration of each test 
sample. 
3.6.4 Grouping and Randomization. 
When applicable, such as for source selection or some types of “Blind 
Testing,” test grouping and randomization concepts will be followed to 
eliminate any bias in test conditions. (U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, 
2008, pp. 6–11) 
D. TEST PROCEDURES 
Test procedures for testing hard armor ballistic inserts are described in TOP 10-2-
210 (U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, 2008) [redacted where necessary and paragraphs 
deleted for brevity]: 
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4.1 Ballistic Test Requirements. 
Body armor test samples must successfully complete both V0 and V50 
ballistic performance test series. The V0 test requires the body armor 
sample to consistently demonstrate ballistic resistance to perforation and 
excessive blunt force trauma (represented by the back face deformation 
following impact of a threat round). The V50 test series is designed to 
provide a statistical approximation of resistance to penetration 
performance. V50 is the velocity at which there is a 50% probability of a 
threat round completely penetrating the body armor sample. Additional 
testing should be conducted to ensure that hard body armor plates do not 
exhibit shatter gap phenomena. 
(Author note: The V50 test series is only required for First Article Testing 
(FAT) for design qualification. It is not required once a design is qualified; 
a contract is executed between the Government and a vendor; and Lot 
Acceptance Testing (LAT) is commenced. The V50 portion of test 
procedures will not be included as it is not crucial to gaining an 
understanding of the material.) 
4.2 Test Sample Mounting. 
Immediately prior to testing, the subject test sample will be visually 
inspected. The hard armor plate is then inserted into the carrier (vest or 
shoot pack), the carrier is closed, and the armor plate is positioned so that 
the lower edge of the armor plate contacts the bottom of the carrier. Next, 
to define a clearly visible fair impact area of the target, the outline of the 
armor plate (outer edge) is traced onto the front of the carrier along with 
the ballistic test fair impact boundaries specified in the governing system 
requirements documentation. After all target markings have been made, 
the plate is then removed (environmentally conditioned if the protocol 
requires) and fitted with a rubber edge strip which serves as the fair hit 
witness for the edge shot (see section 4.6 for detail). The plate will then be 
placed back inside the carrier, the carrier closed, and the plate aligned with 
the previously marked armor plate outline. To prevent clay from adhering 
to the fibers on the rear surface of the vest or shoot pack, silicone lubricant 
may be applied to the rear surface of the vest or shoot pack. Samples will 
then be securely strapped onto the clay block mounting frame, prepared as 
described in paragraph 3.6.2. Figure 7 shows a typical vest sample 
properly mounted for test execution (Note: most tests are conducted using 
shoot packs vs. actual IBA vests). The armor test sample will be securely 
strapped in a position that will provide the required target impact obliquity 
and aim point for each shot. The straps used to secure the armor sample to 
the clay box shall be placed so that the straps are at least [redacted] from 
the aim point of the target if possible (far enough away to prevent spall 
from the front surface of the armor from damaging the straps. The clay 
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block will be rigidly held by a suitable stand capable of withstanding the 
shock force of the threat round impact. Post-test, surface areas of the clay 
backing that may have been in contact with the silicon spray applied to the 
vet or shoot pack will be removed to prevent contamination of the clay 
backing used for subsequent testing. 
Note: When shoot packs (ballistic test surrogate pouches made out of the 
soft fragmentation material) are utilized with hard armor panels in lieu of 
tactical vests, the shoot pack should be positioned such that approximately 
[redacted] of shoot pack material extends beyond the intended impact 
point on the hard plate. When shoot packs are configured to represent the 
size and shape of tactical vest panels, it is not necessary to have [redacted] 
if shoot pack material extend beyond the intended impact points. The 
shoot pack configuration is typically described in the purchase description 
for the armor plates. 




4.3 Spall and Debris Determination. 
Witness sheets for determining potential injuries to the wearer will be 
mounted around the front of the armor test sample. The witness sheets 
shall be [redacted] in size. The witness sheets should assembled into a box 
configuration with the open ended side placed within [redacted] from the 
front of the test armor sample (see Figure 8). A hole at least [redacted] in 
diameter will be made in the front sheet to allow for undisturbed passage 
of the projectile. The projectile impact point should be no closer than 
[redacted] and not further than [redacted] from any witness sheet surface. 
The witness sheet box shall be repositioned after each shot. Perforations in 
the surrounding witness sheets will be counted and documented. 
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4.4 Projectile Yaw Determination. 
Projectile yaw will be checked for each firing by perpendicular high-speed 
video cameras or by means of a yaw card placed approximately [redacted] 
in front of the target location perpendicular to the shot line. After firing, 
yaw cards will be overlaid with a GO/NO GO template showing the 
profile for a [redacted] yaw projectile. Any round for which yaw exceeds 
[redacted], as evidenced by the round passing through the yaw card 
outside of the acceptable template borders, shall be considered an unfair 
hit. 
4.5 Partial and Complete Penetration. 
The definition of a complete penetration and a partial penetration are as 
follows (see Figure 9 for illustrations): 
4.5.1 Complete Penetration (CP). 
The complete penetration of an armor sample or panel occurs when a test 
bullet, or fragment of the bullet or a fragment of the armor sample itself, is 
present in the soft ballistic shoot pack, or creates a hole which passed 
through the armor and/or soft ballistic shoot pack. If a bullet or fragment 
can be seen in or passes through the rear panel of the vest or shoot pack, it 
is a complete penetration. There are two categories of CP, a plate CP in 
which the armor plate is completely penetrated, and a system CP in which 
the entire body armor system is completely penetrated (armor plate and 
carrier/shoot pack). A system CP by definition will also always be a plate 
CP; however, a plate CP in which the round does not completely perforate 
the carrier/shoot pack will not be considered a system CP. This is an 
important distinction particularly when the item under test is a removable 
armor panel or plate and not the entire system. Paint or fibrous materials 
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that are emitted from the back of the test specimen and rest on the outer 
surface of the clay backing are not considered complete penetrations.  
4.5.2 Partial Penetration (PP). 
Any impact that is not a complete penetration is considered a partial 
penetration. 
Figure 9.  Illustrations of Partial and Complete Penetrations 
 
 
4.6 Fair Hit Requirements. 
a. A test shot is considered a fair hit if it impacts the test sample: at an 
angle of incidence (target obliquity) no greater than [redacted] from a line 
normal to the front surface (facing the line of fire) of the clay backing 
block; a projectile yaw of [redacted], no closer to the edge of the ballistic 
panel than the required shot-to-edge distance, and no closer to a prior hit 
than the required minimum shot-to-shot distance. In addition, for the V0 
test series the measured velocity must be within [redacted] of the required 
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velocity for the specified threat round being fired (or as otherwise 
specified in the governing requirements documentation). 
b. For rounds impacting the test sample that fall outside of the required 
velocity, it will still be considered a fair hit if either of the following 
conditions apply (unless otherwise specified by the applicable system 
requirements documentation): 
(1) The required velocity was less than the required minimum velocity 
range for the threat round fired and resulted in a complete penetration or 
exceeded BFD requirements. 
(2) The required velocity was greater than the maximum required velocity 
for the threat round but did not produce a complete penetration or exceed 
the BFD requirements. 
4.6.1 Shot-To-Edge Distance. 
The minimum shot-to-edge distance shall be in accordance with the 
governing system requirements documentation. In order to ensure proper 
edge shot spacing, a rubber edge strip witness will be used. The edge of 
the rubber edge strip provides an impact signature if struck by the 
projectile. The rubber edge strip, shown in Figure 10, will be adhered to 
the edge of the strike face of the armor plate and offset from the fair hit 
boundary by [redacted] of the test threat. In the event that the edge strip 
will not adhere to the hard armor plate the test will continue and the 
deficiency will be noted in the notes section of the data collection sheet. 
4.6.2 Shot-To-Shot Distance. 
The minimum shot-to-shot distance shall be in accordance with the 
governing system requirements documentation. 
Figure 10.  Hard Armor Plate with Rubber Edge Strip 
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4.7 Firing Sequence. 
Consideration should be given to ordering shots to address specific test 
issues as efficiently as possible. Locations that should considered are edge 
hits, center/crown shots, and shots into areas where x-ray data may 
indicate potential weak points. 
4.8 V50 Ballistic Limit: [Deleted].  
4.9 V0 Ballistic Performance Test. 
The objective of the V0 ballistic performance test is to fire projectiles at a 
constant velocity (as specified in the system requirement documents) to 
demonstrate that the armor samples provide specified protection against 
required threats (i.e., all impacts result in partial penetrations and the 
specified maximum back face deformation (BFD) is not exceeded). Multi-
hit performance is also demonstrated during this test phase by firing 
multiple hits on individual armor test plates (the number of impacts to be 
conducted on a single armor sample shall be based on the system 
requirement documents). 
4.9.1 Required Test Conditions. 
The number of V0 test shots to be conducted for each threat projectile, 
protective insert size, and temperature/environmental condition shall be 
based on the system requirement documents. Consideration should be 
given to design a test matrix that will allow a comparison of 1st shots (on 
a plate) versus 2nd shots, and edge shots versus shots in the center area of 
a plate. Described below is a method commonly used when a minimum 
number of shots are conducted to assess V0 performance. A more rigorous 
test approach should be tailored as required if the system requirement 
documents specify required V0 performance metric and/or if additional 
target resources are available to increase confidence in V0 performance. 
4.9.2 V0 Limited Shot Method. 
4.9.2.1 Obliquity and Number of Shots.  
Two shots are fired at the specified V0 velocity at worst case obliquity for 








4.9.2.2 Performance Assessment. 
The test results are evaluated to determine if the test sample meets the V0 
ballistic performance requirements. Typically, V0 ballistic performance 
requirements are considered met if no complete penetrations (perforations) 
occur during this test phase and the maximum depth of BFD meets the 
criteria in the governing system requirements documentation. 
4.9.3 Back Face Deformation (BFD). 
4.9.3.1 Back Face Deformation Limit. 
The BFD caused by ballistic impacts on the test samples has the potential 
to inflict blunt force trauma to the wearer, which can contribute to injury, 
incapacitation, or death. Current guidance contained in governing system 
requirement documentation establishes a BFD limit to protect Soldiers 
wearing the body armor from excessive blunt force trauma due to BFD. 
For evaluation purposes the rounding of BFD measurements will be in 
accordance with the governing system requirement documents. 
4.9.3.2 Metrological Definition of BFD. 
a. Ideal Measurand Definition: The maximum distance length BFD 
(approved by ATC on December 9, 2009) is the length of the longest line 
segment parallel to the reference direction between the pre-impact clay 
surface and the post-impact (BFD) clay surface. The reference direction is 
defined to be perpendicular to the surface of the rigid (metal) frame 
containing the clay backing material, with that surface defined as at least-
squares plane fit through the front surface (i.e., facing the line of fire) of 
the clay backing block. The surface of the clay backing material, at a 
given location, is defined to be the arithmetic average height over a 
centered [redacted] square oriented perpendicular to the reference 
direction. The BFD surface is the clay surface obtained a short time after 
the impacted body armor is removed and with the clay backing block in 
the vertical (as shot) orientation and position. 
b. ATC Daily Practice: [Redacted].  
4.9.3.3 Measurement of BFD. 
a. Due to the irregularities in the shape of the post impact BFD surface in 
the clay backing material, it can be difficult to accurately identify, by 
observation, the point of deepest indentation. In addition, it is not the most 
accurate method to directly measure the maximum distance length BFD by 
mechanical means because the reference point for the maximum distance 
length BFD located on the original, undisturbed curved surface of the 
backing material is destroyed during the ballistic event. 
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b. Given (a), the use of commercially available laser scanning 
instrumentation that can accurately scan and measure the entire surface 
profile of the undisturbed backing material and the BFD impression is 
required. [Remainder redacted]. (U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, 
pp. 16–27) 
E. TEST OVERVIEW CONTEXT 
In reviewing the procedures for IBA ballistic insert live-fire tests, it does not take 
long to realize that it is a complicated and methodical process. The process previously 
outlined is only part of a much larger process of testing body armor systems. This 
overview provides important context when analyzing the events that led to changes in the 
way the Department of the Army tests body armor. In the simplest of terms, the proper 
testing of body armor requires more than just shooting it with a projectile, and ensuring 
that the projectile did not penetrate the armor system. 
Although beyond the scope of this research, it is worth mentioning the 
requirements aspect of testing. The purpose of testing is to determine whether a particular 
materiel solution meets validated military requirements. Requirements are determined by 
the user community (capability developers), and outlined in what the TOP refers to as the 
“governing system requirements documents.” The system must meet all the requirements 
(often in the form of subtests) to pass the overall test. A good example relating to body 
armor is that a system may meet the ballistic requirement (stop the bullet), but not meet 
the weight requirements. The ability to stop a bullet is great, but it is not useful to the 
military if the body armor is so heavy that the wearer loses critical mobility. This 
important aspect of the defense acquisition process is often overlooked by those leveling 
criticism at the process.  
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III. RELEVANT CHRONOLOGY AND DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A chronological examination of the key events outlined in this chapter shows how 
the testing of body armor came to the attention of the public, became an issue for the 
Army and Congress, and how the Army subsequently addressed it. Additional data 
provides a foundation for analysis to answer primary and subsidiary research questions. 
B. ARMY EVALUATION OF DRAGON SKIN, MAY 2006 
The Project Manager, Soldier Equipment (PM SEQ), PEO Soldier conducted a 
test of the Pinnacle Armor SOV 3000, also known as Dragon Skin, body armor system 
from May 16–19, 2006. The test was based on FAT protocols and held at H. P. White 
Laboratory, Incorporated in Street, Maryland. H. P. White is a world-renowned and 
National Institutes of Justice (NIJ)-certified ballistics laboratory. The test was conducted 
at the request of the House Armed Services Committee, and Senator Kay Bailey 
Hutchinson, a Republican from the state of Texas (House Armed Services Committee, 
2007, p. 13).  
C. FINDINGS FROM GAO-07-662R, REVIEW OF BODY ARMOR 
The concerns that prompted this GAO audit are covered in the background of this 
joint applied project. The auditors examined requirements in terms of ballistic protection 
required for theater, and whether deploying Soldiers, Marines, and DOD civilians were 
issued the proper body armor. They also examined how the Army and Marine Corps 
tested body armor. Finally, they examined whether the Army and Marine Corps shared 
information regarding research, development, and the testing of body armor.  
The report summary states:  
 are currently meeting theater ballistic requirements and the 
required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the 
amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq; 
 have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to 
assure that body armor meets requirements; and 
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 share information regarding ballistic requirements and testing, and 
the development of future body armor systems, although they are 
not required to do so. (Solis, 2007, p. 4) 
The second bullet refers specifically to testing. The auditors found that:  
 The Army and Maine Corps have controls in place during 
manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets 
requirements. The Army and the Marine Corps conduct quality and 
ballistic testing prior to fielding. Lots are rejected if the standards 
are not met. (Solis, 2007, p. 16) 
It was noted that the Army ESAPI lot failure rate for 2006–2007 was only 3.32 percent. 
The report also cited efforts by the Army and Marine Corps to monitor armor 
performance in the field (Solis, 2007). Finally, the report states that the, “DOD has a 
standard methodology for ballistic testing of the hard body armor plates, but not for the 
soft body armor vest. Currently, DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) office is developing a standard methodology for ballistic testing of the soft 
body armor to eliminate discrepancies in testing methodologies” (Solis, 2007, p. 5). Prior 
to 2008, the test methodology was included in the purchase description (PD), a document 
developed and maintained by the materiel developer.  
D. THE DATELINE NBC REPORT 
Dateline NBC commissioned a “side-by-side” test of IBA and Dragon Skin body 
armor conducted on May 3, 2007 at Beschussamt Mellrichstadt, a ballistics laboratory in 
Germany. The 9:52-report detailing the results of the test aired on May 20, 2007. The 
report was given by NBC reporter Lisa Myers and included expert commentary from the 
Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, former DOT&E and General (Retired) Wayne A. 
Downing, former Commander, United States Special Operations Command and Deputy 
National Security Advisor under the Bush Administration.  
The report suggested that Dragon Skin body armor was superior to the IBA that 
the Army characterized as the finest body armor in the world. The overall test consisted 
of three subtests. The first two tests were “side-by-side” comparisons of IBA and Dragon 
Skin. Test 1 used armor piercing ammunition, and Test 2 used armor piercing incendiary 
ammunition. The third test was only conducted on the Dragon Skin armor and used an 
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armor-piercing round characterized as composite in nature. All subtests were conducted 
in ambient firing conditions. 
The results of Test 1 were IBA stopped the first three rounds, and was completely 
penetrated on the fourth round. The first two BFDs were acceptable, and the third was 
high. Dragon Skin stopped a total of six rounds, and all BFDs were within the acceptable 
range. The results of Test 2 were IBA stopped four rounds, all with BFDs in the 
acceptable range. The fifth round was stopped, but had a high BFD. The sixth round was 
a complete penetration. Dragon Skin stopped all six rounds, and all BFDs were within the 
acceptable range. The results of Test 3 were Dragon Skin stopped all three rounds of the 
composite armor piercing ammunition, and all BFDs were within the acceptable range 
(NBC News, 2007). 
E. THE ARMY RELEASES RESULTS OF THE DRAGON SKIN TEST 
The results of the this test were released by the Army on May 21, 2007 in 
response to the Dateline NBC report that included a “side-by-side” test of Dragon Skin 
and IBA. 
A briefing released by PM SEQ (see Appendix A) provided the following 
background information: 
 Since the inception of the IBA program in 1999, Pinnacle Armor 
has never responded to a full and open competition. 
 Test was conducted using enhanced small arms protective inserts 
(ESAPI) and enhanced side ballistic inserts (ESBI) first article test 
protocols. 
 Prior to fielding, all ESAPI designs must pass a robust FAT 
protocol under a variety of environmental conditions including 
high (+160º F) and low (-60º F) temperature, diesel fuel, oil, 
saltwater immersion, and a 14-hour temperature cycle from -25º F 
to +120º F. 
 Pinnacle SOV 3000 level IV Dragon Skin suffered catastrophic 
failure of the ceramic disc containment grid adhesive at -60º F, 
120º F and 160º F. 
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 SOV 3000 design is sensitive to extreme temperatures and 
failed to maintain ballistic integrity at temperatures below 
summer ambient in OIF. 
 This failure mode caused discs to delaminate and 
accumulate in the lower portion of the armor panel, thus 
resulting in exposing the spine, vital organs, and critical 
blood vessels to lesser ballistic threats. 
 Pinnacle SOV 3000 level IV Dragon Skin vests suffered 13 first or 
second shot complete penetrations, failing 4 of 8 initial subtests 
with ESAPI threat baseline 7.62x63mm APM2 Armor Piercing 
(AP) ammunition. (Project Manager Soldier Equipment, 2007, 
pp. 2–3) 
Brigadier General Mark Brown held a press conference at the Pentagon that 
coincided with the release of the PM SEQ briefing. Brown summarized the results of the 
test for the press in attendance by stating: “The Pinnacle armor was subjected to the same 
tests Interceptor body armor goes through, first being X-rayed and analyzed and then 
undergoing a series of live-fire tests,” (Wood, 2007).  
Brig. Gen. Brown also noted that the Dragon Skin vests are significantly 
heavier and thicker than the Interceptor vests. Dragon Skin vests in size 
extra large are 47.5 pounds and 1.7 to 1.9 inches thick; the Interceptor 
vests in size large, which offer an equivalent coverage area to the extra 
large Dragon Skin vests, weigh 28 pounds and are 1.3 inches thick. 
(Wood, 2007). 
“Bottom line is it does not meet Army standards,” the general said of the Pinnacle 
body armor (Wood, 2007). 
F. H.A.S.C. HEARING NO. 110-58, JUNE 6, 2007 
The House Armed Services Committee called a hearing (110-58) to address 
questions raised by NBC in the Dateline NBC report, as well as what were viewed as 
contradictory presentations by the Army both before and after the show aired.  
The hearing occurred on June 6, 2007. The key participants were: 
 Ike Skelton, Representative from Missouri, Chairman 
 Duncan Hunter, Representative from California, Ranking Member, 
Committee on Armed Services 
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 Honorable Philip Coyle, former DOT&E, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (Witness) 
 Murray Neal, Founder and CEO, Pinnacle Armor, Incorporated (Witness) 
 Lieutenant General (LTG) N. Ross Thompson, Military Deputy to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (Witness) 
The transcripts of the proceedings including full statements and exhibits are over 
200 pages in length. The statements of the key participants provide the best data for 
analyzing the proceedings.  
The following is the opening statement by the Honorable Ike Skelton, Committee 
Chairman, at the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing on DOD Body 
Armor Programs, held on June 6, 2007: 
The jurisdiction of our committee is such that we cover a wide range of 
issues with the significance of other issues relative to the importance of 
providing the best protection possible for our men and women serving. 
Our committee has been in the forefront providing necessary, nonpartisan 
oversight on the full spectrum of protection matters. Since 2001, our 
committee has authorized over $5 billion to help the services procure body 
armor and expand that industrial base. 
Effective body armor is the baseline component to force protection. It is 
critical promoting survivability of military personnel serving in combat 
environments. 
Recent media reports have suggested that we may not be providing the 
best body armor available. NBC News commissioned an independent 
round of limited ballistic tests that compared current body armor to 
another system called Dragon Skin that was produced by Pinnacle Armor. 
NBC indicates the results from these tests favor Dragon Skin over the 
current military Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). 
NBC tests contradict the information provided to this committee by 
military and Department of Defense (DOD) officials in numerous 
briefings and hearings. Most recently, the Army indicated to this 
committee in a closed briefing on May the 24th that they conducted first 
article live-fire ballistic tests on the Dragon Skin system in May of 2006. 
These tests also included environmental constraints such as subjecting the 
vests to extreme temperatures and fluids to ensure the vests would hold up 
to conditions that the troops might find in the field. The Army tests 
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engaged in showed Dragon Skin failed to meet the military body armor 
specifications. 
We are here today to gain a better understanding of our facts and to 
reassure our constituents that our goal remains that we are ensuring their 
sons and daughters are being provided the best body armor available. 
(House Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 1–2) 
The following quote is the portion of Duncan Hunter’s statement pertaining 
directly to Dragon Skin, IBA, and force protection (the opening portion of his statement 
has been omitted for brevity and relevance): 
I heard about the Dragon Skin either from a soldier or a marine who had 
heard about it from a family member or from a Web site; I can't remember 
exactly which one. But I called our staff here and said, “Bring these guys 
in; let's see what they've got.” 
Your guys, Mr. Neal, came in and met with the Armed Services folks; and 
our guys called up the Army and said, We wanted you to test this, to 
which the Army responded, We have already got a test laid on.  And I 
have got a letter here, but apparently they also responded to Mrs.--to 
Senator Hutchison, who had made a request to have Dragon Skin tested. 
The Army said, We are going to test it; and the Army did test it. 
Now, I have looked at the tests today, the tests that they did, and they said 
they did these tests with you folks present at the test. Showed a lot of 
penetrations. I saw after that--the back-and-forth where you felt that you 
had unfair tests. You shot at the edges, and other things were done that 
you think allowed these penetrations to take place, but there are fairly 
substantial penetrations in that armor. 
Now I understand that you then went to a German tester and you got a test 
done that indicated that Dragon Skin does great. A couple of things: I 
think that there is always a massive bureaucracy in the Department of 
Defense. We all know that, and we in Congress who helped to create that 
bureaucracy with our rules and regulations--many of which attend the 
competitive arena and accommodate the competitive arena, which you 
wouldn't have otherwise. 
But we also have the ability to move very quickly, and often there is a 
response, a bureaucratic response. It builds up. That does impede getting 
equipment to the battlefield quickly. 
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I don't know which category this falls in, but I do know this: The Army 
reported back to us, after we told them we wanted them to test this, that 
they did test this and they told us the results and they showed penetrations. 
I know there are lots of folks, families paying $5K apiece for this body 
armor. I can tell you there are five members of this committee who have 
their kids at one time or another wearing body armor in theater, either Iraq 
or Afghanistan. And that includes this Member of Congress. In fact, as we 
sit here today, my son is wearing, on his third tour, the body armor that is 
issued to him by the U.S. Marine Corps, the same stuff that everybody else 
is using. 
So what I would like you to address today is whether or not you folks have 
come to closure with the Army on doing a test.  
The Army informed us that it took five months to get a set of Dragon Skin 
or enough sets from you guys to get the test done, but that ultimately it 
was done with you folks attending the test. And I want to know what your 
take is, if you stood there and watched them shoot this stuff and the bullets 
went through it, if you think the test was faulty. If it wasn't faulty, why 
didn't you speak up, or let us know that you thought you had a faulty test? 
And did you talk to the Army about it? And then we are going to ask the 
Army if there is an opportunity to take this stuff out and shoot it and see if 
it works. 
And, Mr. Coyle, as a guy who has worked on lots of things like the B-2 
bomber and lots of other very complex systems, it seems to me that this 
shouldn't require rocket science to tell if a bullet goes through a certain 
substance. We ought to be able to figure this out. 
So I hope that we finish this hearing off by coming to some kind of an 
agreed-upon third-party test, Mr. Chairman that will help to resolve this 
issue. And I think we need to move egos and personalities and cross-
currents aside. 
And, Mr. Neal, I saw some pretty strong statements by you after I asked 
our guys to have you come in and show us what you had. They wrote a 
report that said that they saw what the Army had seen on this test. You had 
a couple of strong statements about them to the effect that they were part 
of a--part of the problem. 
And I can just assure you that the guys that we have got working, the men 
and women that we have working on force protection, have had lots of 
occasions when they brought in the Army and the Marine Corps, and this 
committee has brought in the Army and the Marine Corps, and we have 
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put enormous pressure on them when they have not provided what we 
thought was needed to be provided in terms of force protection. 
If you want to go to sleep, get some late night C-SPAN, you can run some 
of the old tests or some of the old C-SPAN of hearings that this committee 
has done on force protection with respect to Humvees, up-armor, and 
jammers and the like. 
So we are interested in making sure we get the right protection for our 
troops. But the big question here is, how could the Army's test--which 
shows complete penetration, and I have looked at it--be so different from 
this test that you folks took with this independent agency in Germany? I 
would like to see those tests reconciled. 
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I think it is 
absolutely timely, and I look forward to seeing how these, how the Army 
tests and the Dragon Skin tests stack up. And if you've got the--if you've 
got the real McCoy, Mr. Neal, we want to get it out there fast. (House 
Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 3–5) 
The following is the statement by Mr. Murray Neal, CEO of Pinnacle Armor: 
Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to come before you today to give you the facts and 
information needed to make sure that as long as we have American men 
and women in harm’s way in Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else, they 
will have the best possible body armor production available. 
My name is Murray Neal, and I am the founder and chief executive officer 
of Pinnacle Armor, a company in Fresno, California. You have my written 
testimony addressing all of the concerns of testing, protocol issues, and 
my request for a fair and honest, unbiased hearing. 
The bottom line for me, and I would say for the American people, is that 
Dragon Skin has been verified as the best body armor in the world by 
testing throughout the U.S., as well as in other allied nations and beyond. 
Therefore, all we ask is for a third-party independent testing of Dragon 
Skin at a facility that has Office of the Secretary of the Defense 
Department Testing and Evaluation oversight. 
Please note that the only testing facility where the Dragon Skin has 
allegedly failed happens to be the only place where the current Interceptor 
has always passed, which is why we are seeking a neutral and independent 
party. 
That testing facility where the Interceptor always passes is the H. P. White 
Laboratory, which is primarily the Army’s go-to lab for the testing of 
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body armor. And I believe that any future tests at that laboratory of either 
type of body armor will yield the same results. 
The Army tells you that it wants to test Dragon Skin along with the 
Interceptor, and we welcome such a test. But they insist on us using rigid-
plate technology, and we insist on using the most technologically 
advanced, only flexible, rifle-defeating body armor in the world. If Dragon 
Skin performed as poorly as the Army claims, why is it doing everything 
in its power to obfuscate and avoid such an independent test, which would 
ostensibly validate its allegations against Dragon Skin and support Army 
claims that the Interceptor is the best body armor in the world, bar none? 
There is a pattern of anti-Dragon Skin disinformation coming from the 
Armed Forces, and most of this can be traced to a single source. 
If that isn’t enough, you would be intrigued that despite the fact that the 
Army claims it uses H. P. White Laboratory as an independent facility, it 
is that source that runs the entire so-called ‘‘independent testing 
protocol,’’ monitors and controls the test. General Mark Brown has told 
you that he told the media in the May 21st briefing that Mr. Karl Masters 
is, in Brown’s words, the chief engineer and test director. That begs the 
question of how independent and unbiased the H. P. White test really was 
or could be in the future. 
The issue of the lack of quality of the Interceptor vests was broadly 
discussed during a Federal investigation of a body armor defense 
contractor that was conducted by the FBI, the Defense Criminal 
Investigative agency and the United States attorney for the Eastern District 
of New York. 
This Federal investigation also determined that fielded Interceptor Body 
Armor did not meet ballistic standards. And the investigator discovered 
that the armor had failed these standards and was recalled, yet it is was 
still issued to our troops. 
The Army allows the test director to have broad discretion above and 
beyond the written test protocols and procedures. 
Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Patricio of the Marine Corps, program 
manager responsible for body armor said, and I quote, ‘‘Failing or passing 
anything, that is a matter of some testing, procedures, and 
interpretations.’’ 
Over a 3-year period from 2002 to 2005, in cooperation with the Army 
Research Lab in Aberdeen, I worked on a development of a testing 
protocol for a flexible, rifle-defeating body armor that would provide a 95 
percent level of confidence indicating multiple high-powered rifle rounds 
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across the board. This is at a success rate level that is 100 percent higher 
than the current issued Interceptor whose ballistic integrity degrades with 
each additional shot. 
Natick was established to test and evaluate clothing and foodstuffs and 
additional, ancillary equipment for the military and now spends 
approximately—the vast majority of its time and budget on the ceramic-
plate-based Interceptor Body Armor system. 
The introduction of a flexible system like Dragon Skin would cost Natick 
a significant chunk of its research and development budget because the 
dated armor plate system would disappear. Could that threat to the 
Natick’s budget be the reason for this opposition? I don’t know. 
Honorable members, when the smoke clears from a true, Independent, 
third-party testing of Dragon Skin, you will see that Dragon Skin has the 
capability to substantially save American lives. That is the bottom line. 
Thank you for your time and your invitation to lay out some facts and the 
true story of Dragon Skin, and for giving me the opportunity to share with 
you my passion for protecting the lives of men and women in harm’s way. 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my testimony and documents 
package to be provided and entered into the record. (House Armed 
Services Committee, 2007, pp. 5–7) 
The following quote is Mr. Coyle’s statement, and it is divided into two parts 
(The portion of the statement omitted covers the NBC test results previously covered in 
paragraph C of this chapter):  
I have over 30 years of test and test-related experience involving U.S. 
defense systems and equipment; and knowing this, NBC invited me to 
observe side-by-side body armor tests that were conducted at the 
Beschussamt Mellrichstadt laboratory in Germany on May 3, 2007. My 
role was to observe those tests, to provide advice and commentary where I 
saw fit; and I neither requested nor received any compensation from NBC 
for my time spent traveling to the laboratory nor for observing the tests. 
This committee needs to be open-minded about looking at the questions 
which the NBC body armor tests have raised. I say this because you know 
that body armor is of critical importance to U.S. military personnel in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. However, in the recent past, this committee has not 
shown itself to be open-minded on issues raised by NBC. I refer to NBC 
reporting on active protective systems. The House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) held two hearings to denounce NBC for raising those 
 33
issues, and those hearings did not engage the specific facts which NBC 
raised. In the course of those two hearings, this committee received 
testimony from the U.S. Army which was misleading and sometimes just 
plain wrong. 
On the positive side, after those two hearings, Senator John Warner 
requested an independent study of active protection systems. That study 
was completed 2 months ago by the Institute for Defense Analyses and 
showed that NBC was correct. The IDA study showed that the Trophy 
Active Protection System was the farthest along, as NBC had reported, 
and ranked the system which the Army system favored, the Raytheon 
``Quick Kill'' system, ninth in terms of technical readiness. 
In short, the IDA report confirmed that NBC got it right. With respect to 
the questions that NBC has raised on body armor, I hope this committee 
will consider that NBC may have gotten it right again. 
From the outset, it was apparent that NBC would not have the capacity to 
conduct full-scale body armor tests that would capture all of the variables 
of importance to the U.S. Army. For example, NBC did not conduct tests 
at high or low temperatures; all of the rounds fired in the NBC body armor 
tests were fired at ambient temperature. Nevertheless, it was important for 
NBC to be sure that their tests, although limited, were fair and conducted 
according to professional standards, which I can attest they were. 
The results of the NBC tests, which are summarized on their Web site, 
were significant. The test showed that the Army Interceptor Body Armor 
meets U.S. Army requirements, something which I myself stated on 
camera. The NBC tests also showed that the ballistic protection from 
Dragon Skin body armor is better. 
I would now like to talk about the actual results of those tests 
commissioned by NBC and conducted on May 3rd in Germany--actually, 
northern Bavaria. 
At NBC's request, the Mellrichstadt laboratory performed comparative 
testing of the Army's body armor, Interceptor, which employs rigid plates 
inserted into large pockets in an outer vest, against Dragon Skin, a flexible 
body armor, which employs a series of overlapping disks, each a little 
larger in diameter than a silver dollar. 
The Mellrichstadt laboratory is well familiar with the specifications 
governing body armor testing, regularly conducts body armor tests and has 
an outstanding reputation as the BMW of ballistic testing laboratories. 
Body armor tests are tested against a special kind of clay that simulates the 
resistance of the human body and provides a way to measure blunt force 
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trauma. After each shot, each vest is removed to see whether or not the 
bullet has penetrated, and if not, to measure the blunt force trauma to a 
person wearing the vest. 
The U.S. Army generally considers a cavity deeper than 44 millimeters to 
be a failure even if the bullet does not penetrate because the shock can be 
so great that the wearer of the body armor could die anyway. The sternum 
is a particularly dangerous area for blunt force trauma, as chest bones can 
be broken and propelled into the heart, lungs and so forth. A ruptured 
spleen or other damaged organ can be very dangerous, if not fatal, also. 
The measure of this blunt force trauma is called BFS, or Back Face The 
measure of this blunt force trauma is called BFS, or Back Face Signature. 
That is the depth of the indentation caused in the clay when a bullet strikes 
a body armor vest. The NBC test consisted of six groups of test firings 
involving a total of 31 rounds of ammunition of different types and 
lethalities. 
Test number one was of Dragon Skin only. That is before the comparative 
testing began, a preliminary series of six shots were fired against Dragon 
Skin only using 7.62 caliber by 51mm long, M80 rounds. This is called a 
Level III threat, meaning capable of defending against high-powered rifle 
ammunition, and both Dragon Skin and Interceptor are National Institute 
of Justice certified at this level. 
The Army requires that three rounds be defeated; the National Institute of 
Justice requires that six rounds be defeated. And in this first test series, six 
rounds were fired at Dragon Skin body armor, and it stopped all six 
rounds, allowing no penetration. The Back Face Signatures were well 
within the Army standard. So this test showed that Dragon Skin could 
defeat this threat and meet both the Army standard and the tougher 
National Institute of Justice standard. 
From this point forward in this open testimony, I do not speak of the 
specific caliber or construction of each round fired in the NBC-sponsored 
test. Similarly, in their broadcast and on their Web site, NBC News did not 
describe the specific caliber or ammunition used in the comparative test 
because the Army believes that level of detail may assist the enemy. 
NBC News did, however, share those details with the Army, and the Army 
itself reported some of those in an open press conference on May 21st. 
(House Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 7–9) 
Given the NBC test results, the refusal of the Army to undertake side-by-
side testing is puzzling. When NBC News Reporter Lisa Myers asked 
General Mark Brown whether the Army would do side-by-side testing, 
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General Brown said that the Army doesn't do side-by-side testing, but tests 
to a standard. Of course, they test to a standard, but NBC News tested both 
vests to the Army standard, and Dragon Skin performed better. 
Side-by-side testing means testing both types of body armor under the 
same conditions according to the same scoring rules, in short, a level 
playing field. 
In his recent press conference, General Brown said he had all of the 
money and all of the leadership support he needed to get body armor and 
to get improvements to body armor. He also said that the Army is never 
satisfied with the status quo and that the Army is always looking for the 
next best thing and that if there is something better out there, we are going 
to buy it after we have live-fire tested it. If this is true, doing fair, 
contemporary, side-by-side tests should not be a problem. 
I am not saying that Interceptor does not provide good protection; nor is 
retired Army General Wayne Downing, who observed the tests with me. 
He noted on camera, as did I, that Interceptor performed well during the 
NBC tests. But Dragon Skin was better, notably against multiple rounds 
and in reducing blunt force trauma which can kill even if a bullet doesn't 
actually penetrate the vest. 
From the body armor tests that I observed in Germany, Dragon Skin 
appears to have five advantages, advantages in which I would think the 
Army and this committee would be interested. Those advantages appear to 
be, first, Dragon Skin is flexible and conforms better to the contours of the 
human body which is also helpful for female soldiers.  Dragon Skin 
covers more of the torso and does not leave gaps. Dragon Skin is better 
against multiple shots. Dragon Skin reduces blunt force trauma. The depth 
of the cavities caused in the test clay by shots fired at Dragon Skin were 
often half as deep as the cavities caused in the clay during Interceptor 
tests. And fifth, Dragon Skin performed perfectly, allowing no 
penetrations, and defeated six rounds of a particularly deadly ammunition 
threat which U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan may face. 
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the controversy over the most effective body 
armor for the U.S. Army has been brewing for a long time and was not 
started by NBC. NBC, ABC, CBS, the Discovery Channel, the History 
Channel and the National Geographic Channel that I know of have all 
either aired programs on this controversy or plan to do so. 
This does not count the scores of prank media sources who have reported 
on the body armor controversy. Even YouTube has pictures of Dragon 
Skin body armor testing on the Internet and Wikipedia has posted a 
carefully documented description of the history of this controversy. Some 
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news organizations have shown successful ballistic tests of Dragon Skin 
body armor conducted on behalf of other agencies such as police 
departments. 
In addition, officials with the FBI, the CIA, the U.S. Marshal Service, the 
GSA, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the Federal Protective Service, 
the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard have all bought or placed orders for Dragon Skin. And so also have 
private security firms that provide security protection for high-ranking 
officials in Iraq or other dangerous places. 
Mr. Chairman, the tests conducted by H. P. White for the Army in May 
2006 and the NBC tests conducted this year can probably never be 
compared one for one. Too much time has passed since the tests a year 
ago, and the Army is overly invested in proving NBC wrong. 
The best way to resolve this matter would be for the U.S. Army Test and 
Evaluation Command to conduct comparable side-by-side tests of both the 
Interceptor and Dragon Skin body armor.  
Those tests should be overseen, in my view, by an independent third party 
such as the Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation. That is what the 
Senate Armed Services Committee has called for, and I hope the House 
Armed Services Committee will join the Senate to call for a fair, balanced, 
and refereed body armor testing program.  Committee has called for, and I 
hope the House Armed Services Committee will join the Senate to call for 
a fair, balanced, and refereed body armor testing program. (House Armed 
Services Committee, 2007, pp. 10–12) 
The relevant portion of Lieutenant General Thompson’s statement: 
The safety of our soldiers is paramount. In March of 2006, the Army 
issued a Safety of Use Message prohibiting the use of any commercially 
available body armor products to include Dragon Skin that are not Army 
approved and issued. 
This Safety of Use Message was issued as a result of several previous tests 
that took place from May 2004 to February of 2006 on Dragon Skin. 
These tests indicated that Dragon Skin did not meet the Army 
requirements. So we are talking about five previous tests, not just the test 
in May of 2006 that was referred to in the panel one testimony today. 
As a result of the Safety of Use Message Pinnacle Dragon Skin 2000 Body 
Armor purchased by an Army unit was turned into the PEO and as 
indicated during the previous panel's testimony, it contained a fraudulent 
National Institute of Justice certification statement that was fully 8 months 
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before the National Institute of Justice certified that version of the body 
armor. 
Each vest contained the Pinnacle Armor's manufacture label with the 
compliance statement that was read by Chairman Skelton. 
Army coordination with the National Institute of Justice revealed that this 
statement was not true. As of April 2006, the 2000 Dragon Skin armor had 
not been tested by NIJ and was not certified to defeat the Level III threat. 
In my opinion, this is a serious fraudulent claim, and it is my hope that the 
investigative process results in the appropriate consequences. 
In the interest of fairness and because of intense media interest in Dragon 
Skin, the Army chose to run a full test of Dragon Skin last spring. In May 
2006, H. P. White Laboratory, an independent test facility, certified by the 
National Institute of Justice for ballistic testing, tested Pinnacle's 3000 
Level IV Dragon Skin vest using the same test protocols that we use with 
the Interceptor Body Armor. Before the testing was halted, the Dragon 
Skin vest suffered 13 of 48 first- or second-round shot complete 
penetrations failing four of eight initial subtests. 
The bottom line is that the Dragon Skin vest did not stop the bullets. 
And we can get into this in the questions and answers later, but 
Congressman Snyder and others asked a key question on who provided 
that body armor for the test that was conducted by NBC in Germany, and 
we have indicated from talking to NBC that PPI provided that body armor 
but that body armor that was provided for the NBC test was not from one 
of the six certified and tested producers of the body armor that is used by 
the military. 
Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to highlight an issue of grave 
concern to me and that is the role of a responsible press, and in that term, I 
include the print media and the broadcasting industry. The press is an 
important guarantor of our freedom, and with that right, comes the 
responsibility to get the facts right and the stories straight. 
The Army did not go public with our test results from last year because we 
are dealing with the very media-savvy enemy. The airing of the NBC 
news story prompted the Army to release information to assure service 
members and their families that the Army is providing the best body armor 
available. In this case, credible and factual evidence provided by the Army 
was cast aside for a sensational story that just was not true. It created 
needless worry among our men and women in uniform and their families 
and provided an adaptable enemy with additional information about how 
we equip our solders for the important missions they perform. It is a most 
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unfortunate situation, and in my view, brings NBC's credibility into 
serious question. (House Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 54–55) 
G. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT NO. D-
2009-047, DOD TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR BODY ARMOR, 
JANUARY 29, 2009 
Although the specific subject matter of this report is not a part of this research 
effort, the report contains comments by the Secretary of the Army and DOT&E that 
indicate the Army’s intent to, at a minimum, conduct all future first article tests for body 
armor through ATEC. The report was issued on January 29, 2009; 11 days prior to the 
issuance of the Popps Memorandum entitled, Testing of Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) (see Appendix B). 
The relevant Secretary of the Army comments are as follows: 
 The Secretary also stated that he associated himself with the 
January 16, 2009, memorandum provided by the Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology), which endorsed comments from PEO Soldier. He 
further stated that as the Principal Deputy’s memorandum 
explains, the Army, with DOT&E oversight, initiated 
comprehensive action to fix its testing system beginning in June 
2007. 
 The Secretary of the Army concluded that there is no higher 
priority for the Army than the safety of soldiers. He stated that 
anything that threatens the safety or erodes the confidence of 
soldiers, or the American people in the Army’s commitment to 
their safety, is a matter of utmost importance to Army leadership. 
(United States Department of Defense Inspector General, 2009, 
p. 14) 
Relevant DOT&E comments are as follows: 
 Additionally, he stated that DOT&E ensured that the correctly 
sized plates were tested during preliminary design model testing in 
2008 and that PEO Soldier intends to conduct all future first article 
tests at the Army Test and Evaluation Command to prevent 
recurrence of these issues. (United States Department of Defense 
Inspector General, 2009, p. 19) 
 The DOT&E also supports PEO Soldier’s intent to correct 
deficiencies in the first article testing process. The DOT&E also 
 39
supports PEO Soldier’s intent to sponsor testing at Government 
facilities with independent Government oversight when possible 
and, when not possible, to use independent Government personnel 
to oversee testing. He stated that conducting first article testing at a 
Government facility, under Government oversight, and with 
adequate test processes significantly reduces the risk that the issues 
discussed in finding A will recur. (United States Department of 
Defense Inspector General, 2009, p. 23)  
H. MEMORANDUM FOR PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE SOLDIER, 
SUBJECT: TESTING OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) 
(POPPS MEMORANDUM), FEBRUARY 9, 2009 
This memorandum (see Appendix B) was issued on February 9, 2009. The first 
paragraph is particularly relevant to this research: 
Recent internal and external reviews indicate that the testing process for 
personal protection equipment needs to be improved. The Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC) have both the expertise and the mission to 
test Body Armor. I direct that ATEC conduct all Body Armor first article 
and lot acceptance testing. Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier will 
ensure all solicitations articulate this policy. (Department of the Army, 
2009) 
I. GAO-10-119, INDEPENDENT EXPERT ASSESSMENT OF BODY ARMOR 
TEST RESULTS AND PROCEDURES NEEDED BEFORE FIELDING, 
OCTOBER 2009  
The GAO-10-119 report on the first two body armor tests conducted after the 
decision was made to test body armor at ATEC, specifically the ATC, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, MD.  
The first test that GAO auditors observed was referred to as the preliminary 
design model (PDM) test. The test was conducted from February to June 2008. The 
purpose of the test was to determine whether the systems submitted met ballistic 
performance specifications to be awarded a production contract (Solis, 2009, p. 2). 
This was a test of body armor systems submitted in response to a May 2007 
solicitation that included the previous suppliers of IBA to the Army along with a flexible 
Small Arms Protective Vest-Enhanced (FSAPV-E) design. The flexible armor design was 
the Pinnacle Armor, Inc. Dragon Skin vest (Solis, 2009). It should be noted that this test 
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included Small Arms Protective Insert-X level (XSAPI) and Pinnacle Armor’s version of 
that protective solution, Flexible Small Arms Protective Insert-X level (FSAPV-X). This 
level of protection is not discussed. 
The Army awarded four indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts 
worth over $8 billion for the production of ESAPI and XSAPI plates. Of particular note is 
the fact that neither of the Pinnacle Armor, Inc. Dragon Skin designs passed this test 
(Solis, 2009, p. 2). 
The auditors observed test procedures, spoke with Army officials, and compared 
observations with established test protocols (Solis, 2009). The test procedures were 
outlined in the purchase descriptions from the solicitation.  
The GAO found that:  
During Preliminary Design Model testing the Army took significant steps 
to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout the process, 
but the Army did not always follow established testing protocols and, as a 
result, did not achieve its intended test objective of determining as a basis 
for awarding contracts which designs met performance requirements. In 
the most consequential of the Army’s deviations from testing protocols, 
the Army testers incorrectly measured the amount of back-face 
deformation in the clay backing at the point of aim rather than at the 
deepest point of depression. Army testers recognized the error after 
completing about a third of the test and then changed the test plan to call 
for measuring at the point of aim and likewise issued a modification to the 
contract solicitation. At least two of the eight designs that passed 
Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have 
failed if measurements had been made to the deepest point of depression. 
The deviations from the testing protocols were the result of Aberdeen Test 
Center’s incorrectly interpreting testing protocols. In all these cases of 
deviations from the testing protocols, the Aberdeen Test Center’s 
implemented procedures were not reviewed or approved by the Army and 
Department of Defense officials responsible for approving the testing 
protocols. After concerns were raised regarding the Preliminary Design 
Model testing, the decision was made not to field any of the plate designs 
awarded contracts until after First Article Testing was conducted. Note: 
This is from the first page of the GAO Highlights for GAO-10-119, and no 
page number is provided. (Solis, 2009) 
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The second test was a FAT conducted as a follow-up to the PDM test due to the 
issues previously mentioned. The GAO observed this test in the same manner and noted 
the following: 
During First Article Testing, the Army addressed some of the problems 
identified during Preliminary Design Model testing, but GAO observed 
instances in which Army testers did not follow the established protocols 
and did not maintain internal controls over the integrity and reliability of 
data, raising questions as to whether the Army met its First Article Test 
objective of determining whether each of the contracted designs met 
performance requirements. The following are examples of deviations from 
testing protocols and other issues that GAO observed: 
 The clay backing placed behind the plates during ballistics testing 
was not always calibrated in accordance with testing protocols and 
was exposed to rain on one day, potentially impacting test results. 
 Testers improperly rounded down back-face deformation 
measurements, which is not authorized in the established testing 
protocols and which resulted in two designs passing First Article 
Testing that otherwise would have failed. Army officials said 
rounding is a common practice; however, one private test facility 
that rounds told GAO that they round up, not down. 
 Testers used a new instrument to measure back-face deformation 
without adequately certifying that the instrument could function 
correctly and in conformance with established testing protocols. 
The impact of this issue on test results is uncertain, but it could call 
into question the reliability and accuracy of the measurements. 
 Testers deviated from the established testing protocols in one 
instance by improperly scoring a complete penetration. As a result, 
one design passed First Article Testing that would otherwise have 
failed. 
With respect to internal control issues, the Army did not consistently 
maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of 
test data. In one example, during ballistic testing, data were lost, and 
testing had to be repeated because an official accidentally pressed the 
delete button and software controls were not in place to protect the 
integrity of test data. Army officials acknowledged that before GAO’s 
review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we 
identified. 
As a result of the deviations from testing protocols that GAO observed, 
four of the five designs that passed First Article Testing and were certified 
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by the Army as ready for full production would have instead failed testing 
at some point during the process, either during Preliminary Design Model 
testing or the subsequent First Article Test. Thus, overall reliability and 
repeatability of the test results are uncertain. Although designs passed 
testing that would not have if the testing protocols were followed, 
independent ballistics experts have not assessed the impact of the 
deviations from the testing protocols to determine if the effect of the 
deviations is sufficient to call into question the ability of those designs to 
meet requirements. Vendors whose designs passed First Article Testing 
have begun production of plates. The Army has ordered 2,500 sets of 
plates (at two plates per set) from these vendors to be used for additional 
ballistics testing and 120,000 sets of plates to be put into inventory to 
address future requirements. However, to date, none of these designs have 
been fielded because, according to Army officials, there are adequate 
numbers of armor plates produced under prior contracts already in the 




On April 26, 2007, the GAO released GAO-07-662R, Review of Body Armor.  
As stated on the GAO website: 
Our Mission is to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the 
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American 
people. We provide Congress with timely information that is objective, 
fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced. 
Our Work is done at the request of congressional committees or 
subcommittees or is mandated by public laws or committee reports. We 
also undertake research under the authority of the Comptroller General. 
We support congressional oversight by: 
 Auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are 
being spent efficiently and effectively; 
 Investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities; 
 Reporting on how well government programs and policies are 
meeting their objectives; 
 Performing policy analyses and outlining options for congressional 
consideration; and 
 Issuing legal decisions and opinions, such as bid protest rulings 
and reports on agency rules. 
We advise Congress and the heads of executive agencies about ways to 
make government more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable and 
responsive. 
Our work leads to laws and acts that improve government operations, 
saving the government and taxpayers billions of dollars. (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2015) 
GAO-07-662R was released less than a month prior to the Dateline NBC report, 
and just over a month before HASC hearing 110-58. The report found very little in terms 
of issues with body armor to include the testing processes. This analysis examines why 
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Congress, in spite of the findings of its own auditing organization, questioned the Army’s 
handling of body armor procurement (including testing), how that led to the decision to 
test all body armor at ATEC, and the impacts of that decision. 
B. THE DATELINE NBC REPORT 
NBC characterized this test as an “independent side-by-side test.” It is a perfect 
example of Chapter II, Section E, Test Overview Context. Testing body armor is more 
than just shooting it with a projectile, and ensuring that the projectile did not penetrate the 
armor system. From what NBC presented, it is not possible to know how the Dragon Skin 
armor was targeted for the test. Additionally, it is also not possible to validate that the 
armor represented as IBA was actually from the Army production line.  
When conducting live-fire test and evaluation on any system, one of the 
objectives should be to determine if the system has weaknesses that will compromise its 
performance. The 2006 Army test of Dragon Skin at H. P. White Laboratories used an 
ESAPI FAT test protocol with shot patterns developed to ensure any potential 
weaknesses would be discovered. The test proved that that the system did not meet Army 
ballistic requirements. The test was extensively documented to include videotaping of all 
of the sub-tests. Brigadier General Mark Brown, Program Executive Officer Soldier, was 
interviewed as part of the segment. He cited the fact that the Army tests to a standard 
(versus “side-by-side”), and that Dragon Skin had failed 13 out of 48 shots when tested 
by the Army (Wood, 2007). It was a reference to the H. P. White test, although it was not 
identified specifically. 
NBC also failed to acknowledge that the Level IV version (designed to defeat 
armor piercing ammunition) of Dragon Skin that is the ballistic equivalent of IBA failed 
to meet Army weight requirements. As detailed in the Weight/Coverage slide of the PM 
SEQ briefing on the 2006 test (see Appendix A), the Level IV Dragon Skin vest in size 
extra-large weighed approximately 48 pounds versus approximately 28 pounds for the 
IBA with torso and side inserts. It was also noted that the extra-large Dragon Skin vest 
was equivalent to a size large Interceptor vest.  
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In spite of personally witnessing the H. P. White test, Mr. Murray Neal, the 
Pinnacle Armor Chief Executive Officer, stated in the NBC report that he would put his 
system up against the Army’s system “any day of the week” (NBC News, 2007). Mr. 
Neal’s persistence and use of the system by other U.S. government agencies made the 
story appear even more credible. Additionally, certain elements in the Army had procured 
the concealable version of Dragon Skin for members of protective details assigned to 
general officers in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). It was done outside 
of the normal procurement channels. NBC cited the use of this version of Dragon Skin by 
the protective detail of General Peter Chiarelli, then Commander of Multi-National Corps 
Iraq, in spite of an Army-wide Safety of Use message banning the use of any armor 
system other than IBA (NBC News, 2007). 
The result of the Dateline NBC report and several follow-up reports was the call 
by several members of Congress for an independent investigation to determine which 
armor system was the best. Congress moved quickly, and set a hearing for June 6, 2007. 
Regardless of the credibility of the NBC test, the damage to the confidence of many 
Soldiers, Marines, and their families was done, and it was a key factor that would 
influence decision makers. 
C. H.A.S.C. HEARING NO. 110-58 
The HASC held the hearing on DOD Body Armor Systems on June 6, 2007. The 
HASC members and Army representatives were very thorough in detailing exactly how 
limited and misleading the NBC test was in determining which system was the better 
body armor design, as well as rebutting claims of unfair treatment by Mr. Neal. Michael 
Turner, Ohio, stated, “Mr. Neil, I have got to tell you, I have been on this committee five 
years. Your presentation has to be one of the least professional I have ever seen in front 
of this committee” (House Armed Services Committee, 2007, p. 42). 
Duncan Hunter did the best job of rebutting Mr. Coyle’s statement before the 
committee, and exposing Mr. Neal’s deceptive Dragon Skin “marketing” campaign 
despite over-simplifying the process of testing body armor in his opening statement by 
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saying, “it seems to me that this shouldn’t require rocket science to tell if a bullet goes 
through a certain substance” (House Armed Services Committee, 2007, p. 4). 
The following are excerpts from Duncan Hunter’s questioning of Mr. Coyle and 
Mr. Neal that force both into admitting that what was aired on Dateline NBC was 
inaccurate and misleading, and that the Army’s original test at H. P. White proved that 
Dragon Skin was not ready to be fielded to Soldiers and Marines. 
Coyle Questioning: 
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Having said that, Mr. Coyle, you have a long reputation 
of very fastidious testing where you would come to this committee after 
something had been shot 15, 20, 30, 40, 50 times and you would say no, it 
is not ready for prime time. We had a failure. 
Now here is what we had. Mr. Neal had a test with the U.S. Army for 
practical purposes in a lab with integrity, a recognized certified, et cetera, 
laboratory. They had a test with him standing there and did a penetration. 
They then went to you and NBC and you guys did a separate test. 
Did he tell you about the first test where they had the penetration? 
Mr. Coyle. I saw from, as I say materials that I saw in the press and other 
places, I saw that that had happened. So I knew that the history from the 
tests a year ago was different. I didn’t know what to expect---- 
The Chairman. Let me interrupt. Answer the question. Did he tell you? 
Mr. Coyle. He didn’t, but he didn’t need to because I already knew it. 
Mr. Hunter. You knew there had been a total frontal penetration in this. 
Mr. Coyle. I knew that before the tests in Germany began. 
Mr. Hunter. I thought you told me earlier on in this testimony, I asked you 
after you had done the 12 shots or the 18 shots that were done in Germany, 
if you knew about the shot that went all the way through that was done in 
the Army lab, would you have then said that this was superior to the Army 
product and you said no. At least, that is what I got back about half an 
hour ago. 
Mr. Coyle. If the results in Germany had been like the results that are---- 
Mr. Hunter. That wasn’t my question. My question was if you had known 
about those results at a government lab like the ones you relied on for 
 47
years when you take data from one of those government labs and say, 
Armed Services Committee, this is what we just got. The missile failed. I 
would not recommend going ahead. You did not say I think that this is 
duplicitous or we should do another test with a non-governmental lab. You 
said they failed. Don’t go ahead. Now you had a shoot there that would 
have been fatal to a soldier wearing that vest, right? 
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Now if you had known that and you presumed that it 
was done under good conditions, and in this case they are unique 
conditions because your client or clients or the gentleman who owns the 
company was allowed by the Army was allowed to stand there and watch 
the shot and boom, the shot went through, would you have then said 
without further testing that this appeared to be a superior product to the 
Army product? 
Mr. Neal. If I hadn’t seen the results from the tests in Germany, no, sir. 
The Army has, I think, a very important position here. The Army says that 
one penetration is too many. And I agree with that. I think they are just 
right when they emphasize that point of view. 
Mr. Hunter. So here is my question. You took how many shots in 
Germany? 
Mr. Coyle. All in all, of all of the different types, 31. 
Mr. Hunter. But the ones that you had, your primary ones you talked to us 
about, that was 18: Three sets of 6; is that right? 
Mr. Coyle. Yes. 
Mr. Hunter. So you took three sets of six and you had no penetrations, 
right? 
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Neal, before that, had his product which he selected, took 
down to the Army lab and they shot it and no complaints from Mr. Neal 
and boom, it went through with a killing shot, right? 
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hunter. So for practical purposes there you have at least one killing 
shot, and then you did 18 that were defeated. 
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Now I have known you for a long time testifying before this committee. 
Would you think that you could make that conclusive statement that it was 
superior to the Army product without shooting it a lot more times? This is 
the operational and test guy who tells us that thoroughness is so 
important? 
Mr. Coyle. All I said was based on the test that I saw in Germany, 
Pinnacle performed better. 
Mr. Hunter. We are getting to my point, and Mr. Chairman, I hope you 
would suffer me here because this is an important point. 
Based on your statement, because you have a—you have an outstanding 
reputation. You are charged not only with the tests that you stood and 
watched, you are also charged with the information that comes from an 
officially certified military lab, like the ones you relied on for 20 years in 
your profession. 
Now having known that fact, and Mr. Neal does not dispute it, that was a 
killing shot through that vest, would you then say that this lab—that this 
vest was ready for prime time? 
Mr. Coyle. No, sir, and I do not say that today. What I say is the tests in 
Germany, which were limited, and which I say in my testimony were 
limited, based on those, as far as they went, which wasn’t far enough, the 
Dragon Skin did better. 
Mr. Hunter. So you are saying today, and I hope somebody from NBC is 
in the audience, you are saying today that based on those 18 shots and the 
shot that you now know about that was a killing shot; you can’t say it is 
ready for prime time; is that your testimony? 
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. (House Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 47–48) 
Hunter summarized Mr. Neal’s deceptive practices with these comments: 
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Mr. Neal, having said that then, don’t you think it is 
your obligation to tell the mothers and dads of this country when they read 
these articles that imply that Dragon Skin is a supreme type of a protection 
system, that you, in fact, did the test, the test that you did, that you don’t 
disagree with, when you were standing there you were personally there, a 
killing shot went through that. Don’t you think they need to know that as a 
caveat before they go down and spend their $5,000? And Mr. Coyle, your 
tester, now says it is not ready for prime time. 
Now don’t you think that you at least owe that—if you are going to have 
these statements circulating in the press that are going to upset parents and 
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make them think that there is a super system out there, and it may overall, 
in fact, I think some of the aspects of this system, the flexibility of the 
system, the possibility being able to use this where you can put more 
weight on it where you are using armored vehicles, etcetera, where you are 
not having to carry stuff in a squad formation, I think there is a lot of 
possibilities here. 
But I think the idea that you circulate this implication without telling them 
that you stood there and watched a killing shot go through this, I think that 
is not full disclosure. I think you owed full disclosure to Mr. Coyle, and I 
hope Mr. Coyle says it is not ready for prime time. That is not the headline 
that goes out over Dragon Skin. The headline that goes out over Dragon 
Skin is that it is fantastic. 
One last point here that I think needs to be made is this: I saw this thing, 
and I told my guys to have you come in, or whoever your team is and 
show us because I wanted to get good stuff out to the field. About a year 
before NBC showed it. 
Your guys came in, they briefed up our team. We called the Army, told 
them to test it. They said we are testing it, and they subsequently tested it, 
and those are the results that we have been discussing in that handout. 
That they did test it. And it may be better than they have advertised. It 
may be worse than they have advertised, and I want to see a test. In fact, I 
am ready to go down with an M-14 and some 7.62 stuff to the Marine 
Corps lab and try to get some shots off in the next week or so. 
But everywhere you go, you leave the implication that everybody is a 
devil. I have got great professional staff members who called your guys in 
at my request, not NBC’s, long before they discovered this because we 
heard about it. A few days later, their names pop up on Web sites saying 
that staff members of the Armed Services Committee are the devil that 
somehow they are in a conspiracy to thwart you from trying to get good 
stuff to the troops. 
Every place you go you get these apocalyptic letters describing anybody 
who has questions about this as a devil and when you are asked about this 
about these letters in the hearing, you say you know, I was just passing 
along the concerns of the families. 
I think it might be interesting for the families to know, in fact I would like 
to hear from them, how many got the information from you when you 
stood there and had your test, your vest shot, and the bullet went all the 
way through it, and you didn’t report that to anybody. You didn’t think 
those families needed to be burdened with that knowledge, did you? 
(House Armed Services Committee, 2007, pp. 49–50) 
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Perhaps an even more damaging blow to Mr. Neal’s credibility and to Dragon 
Skin’s performance reputation came from the statement of the United States Air Force 
representative to the proceedings. Douglas D. Thomas was the Executive Director for the 
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). He testified that in January of 2006, the 
Dragon Skin vests that the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) tested had failed. They 
subsequently sent vests to the Aberdeen Test Center in February 2006 where they again 
failed (House Armed Services Committee, 2007). 
On May 11, 2006, OSI was notified by the National Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) that the SOV 2000 vests they had purchased 
were not tested or certified to NIJ standards (House Armed Services Committee, 2007). 
Thomas stated, “In May of 2006, OSI opened a joint criminal investigation with 
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) against Pinnacle Armor for false NIJ 
certification on the vests and false representation of its capabilities. In June 2006, we 
tested the vests again with HP White, and failed” (House Armed Services Committee, 
2007, p. 58). 
Although Mr. Neal’s claims and the NBC report were discredited during the 
course of the proceedings, Dragon Skin was given the opportunity to compete officially 
against ESAPI under the conditions that Mr. Neal sought, the test would be conducted at 
a facility considered to be unbiased, and overseen by a neutral third party. Two of the 
subsidiary research questions are answered in this portion of the testimony, specifically 
when Dr. Vic Snyder, Arkansas, was questioning LTG Thompson before and after a 
recess in the proceedings. Prior to the recess, Dr. Snyder stated,  
General Thompson, I want to quibble with you a little bit. I don’t think 
this is NBC’s problem; I think it is our problem. We have got a lot of 
military families out there and people in the public that have questions 
about this. And for whatever reason it has been generated, we all need to 
do a better job of answering it. And the reality is, the NBC show, there are 
some questions to be asked about what NBC showed. (House Armed 
Services Committee, 2007, pp. 68–69) 
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The key piece of that statement, and the reality of the situation, was that doubts were 
raised not only in the minds of military families and the public, but, more importantly, in 
the minds of Soldiers and Marines themselves. 
The portion of LTG Thompson’s testimony that occurred after the recess, along 
with the Dr. Snyder’s statement regarding whose problem it was, answers the first 
subsidiary research question: 
 What were the reasons for the decision to conduct all IBA hard armor 
ballistic insert testing through ATEC versus National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) certified laboratories? 
On pages 70–71 of the hearing transcripts, Dr. Snyder asked LTG Thompson 
about a pending ESAPI request for proposal (RFP) released in May 2007. He asked 
whether all the current ESAPI manufacturers had to re-compete for this RFP, and if 
Pinnacle would be able to submit a proposal even though theirs was a flexible vs. 
monolithic design? LTG Thompson acknowledged that Pinnacle would be able to submit 
a proposal (House Armed Services Committee, 2007). 
LTG Thompson went on to state (key pieces in bold): 
Anybody that wants to continue to produce for us has got to respond to 
this RFP. 
So I think the way ahead here very clearly is not an individual side-by-side 
between IBA and Pinnacle.  
I heard what Mr. Neal said about responding to our RFPs. I checked with 
the program office here. He has not responded to our RFPs for body armor 
level IV. But we have the RFP on the street; 60 days from 25 May, which 
is the end of July, anybody that has got a product that can be put forward 
to be considered, to include Pinnacle—if Pinnacle puts forward their 
product to this RFP, we will test it along with every other competitor that 
comes forward out there. 
And I think that is a fair and reasonable way ahead, because then they will 
get the time to respond to the RFP. But if they don’t respond to the RFP, 
as an acquisition professional, I think it would be unfair to the other 
competitors to test them individually. 
So I think the way ahead here is, 60 days from now, whoever responds 
to that RFP—and I hope Pinnacle does respond—we will test to that 
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standard. We will test by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. 
We will pick an objective site; and I will tell you right now we won’t 
pick H. P. White for this one. 
In the audience today, and I talked to him yesterday, and I just talked 
to him a few minutes ago, is the current head of live fire testing for 
DOD, Mr. Rick Sayre, and we will have DOT&E, Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, the organization that Mr. Coyle 
used to head, oversee the ATEC testing of whoever responds to that 
RFP by the end of July. 
And I think that is a reasonable way ahead here for the committee, for the 
Army, and for Pinnacle, should they choose to respond to the RFP. (House 
Armed Services Committee, 2007, p. 71) 
The “objective site” that LTG Thompson referred to turned out to be the ATEC’s 
ATC.  
 The second subsidiary research question is: Who were important 
stakeholders in the decision making process, and what did they have at 
stake regarding this decision? 
Obviously, Congress was a key stakeholder in the decision-making process, and 
facilitated the decision by holding this hearing. Congress is responsible for providing for 
the common defense and raising and supporting the Army. Clearly, the public’s 
confidence was at stake. The Congressmen cited in this research could all be considered 
important stakeholders.  
Additional stakeholders were: 
 LTG Thompson—as the highest-ranking uniformed Army Acquisition 
officer and the Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, was responsible for all 
matters relating to the research, development, and fielding of equipment to 
the Army.  
 Mr. Richard Sayre—as the Deputy Director for Live Fire Test and 
Evaluation (LFT&E), Office of DOT&E, his responsibilities included 
providing guidance on LFT&E matters; providing input regarding LFT&E 
to DOT&E annual reports to Congress; and approving test plans for LF 
oversight programs. His duties also included reporting to Congress on 
matters regarding survivability and the adequacy of LFT&E. (Office of the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2015) 
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This decision, in effect, put body armor on the DOT&E Live Fire Test and 
Evaluation Oversight List. At that time, the Honorable Dr. Charles E. McQueary was the 
Director, DOT&E. 
Although other stakeholders advised and provided input, the aforementioned can 
be directly documented as playing key roles in the decision-making process.  
D. THE DECISION TO TEST AT ABERDEEN TEST CENTER 
This portion of the analysis answers the primary research question: 
 What are the impacts, positive and negative, of the decision to conduct 
IBA hard armor ballistic insert testing through the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC)? 
The research showed that with the exception of relieving the immediate pressure 
from the media and Congress, the impacts in the short term were negative. 
In light of the heavy media coverage and concerns voiced by the families of 
Soldiers and Marines, it is understandable that Congress and the Army wanted to address 
the concerns quickly, and restore faith. However, the circumstances did not provide the 
decision makers time to do a thorough mission analysis and develop sound courses of 
action.  
From a mission analysis perspective, the following areas immediately stand out: 
 Constraints. 
 Time. The decision to test at ATEC was made in June 2007, and 
PDM testing commenced in February 2008. That timeframe gave 
the Army approximately seven months to resource, outfit, train, 
and rehearse this test mission. It is likely that LTG Thompson, 
Brigadier General Brown, and Mr. Sayre did not know exactly 
when the test would be executed; however, they did know they 
were working within the constraints of an active solicitation that 
would require a compressed time schedule. 
 Test Experience. The personnel with critical body armor test 
experience resided within PEO Soldier. ATC had not tested IBA 
for PEO Soldier since the 1990s.  
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The following quote was later articulated in GAO-10-119, and addresses both of 
these constraints:  
Traditionally, Army body armor testing had been performed at an NIJ-
certified facility. However, one manufacturer of flexible small arms 
protective vests, which had failed previous testing conducted for the PEO 
Soldier at an NIJ-certified facility made allegations that the PEO Soldier 
and the facility had wrongly failed its designs. As a result of these 
allegations, the Army decided instead to conduct testing for its current 
solicitation at the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center, which had not performed 
testing of Interceptor Body Armor for PEO Soldier since the 1990s. 
Additionally, PEO Soldier decided not to provide any on-site testing 
oversight to avoid any appearance of bias against that manufacturer. 
(Solis, 2009, p. 2) 
The IBA Ballistic Insert Test Overview indicates how big an undertaking it was 
under the aforementioned constraints. The overview is an extract from TOP 10-2-210 
dated October 1, 2008. The TOP was not even published until four months after PDM 
testing had been completed, and 16 months after the decision had been made to test at 
ATC. Although test procedures were part of the purchase descriptions provided in the 
contract solicitation, they were not standard procedures for the testers at ATC. This lack 
of experience combined with PEO Soldier’s experts not being available to assist, led to 
problems during the PDM test. 
The problems in both PDM and the FAT have been previously covered, but an 
interesting aspect to these tests was not addressed in any of the official publications 
reviewed in the course of this research. The GAO stated, “The objective of PDM testing 
was to determine whether candidate designs submitted under the solicitation met required 
ballistics performance specifications and would be awarded a production contract” (Solis, 
2009, p. 2). That statement is the definition of a FAT. In fact, this test was supposed to be 
a FAT. So why did it become known as a PDM test? The answer is obvious; the problems 
during this test required another test. That test was called a FAT and sufficient problems 
with it raised doubts as to whether the designs could meet requirements. Objective 
analysis of the facts leads to the conclusion that these two tests were failures. 
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The PDM test took place from February to June 2008. The FAT occurred between 
November and December 2008. The Popps Memorandum was issued on February 9, 
2009. The first paragraph of the memorandum (see Appendix B) states: 
Recent internal and external reviews indicate that the testing process for 
personal protection equipment needs to be improved. The Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC) have both the expertise and the mission to 
test Body Armor. I direct that ATEC conduct all Body Armor first article 
and lot acceptance testing. Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier will 
ensure all solicitations articulate this policy. (Department of the Army, 
2009) 
Given the results of the first two tests, this quote was an interesting statement. The 
only logical conclusion is that the Army did not need any additional negative attention. 
This conclusion makes sense, given that DoDIG Report No. D-2009-047 had been 
released on January 29, 2009 and recommended the recall of 16,413 sets of ballistic 
inserts purchased under Army Contract 0040 (United States Department of Defense 
Inspector General, 2009, p. i). 
The long-term impacts of the decision to test at ATC are positive. In accordance 
with the DOT&E recommendations from DoDIG Report No. D-2009-047, PEO Soldier 
permanently stationed a test oversight element comprised of a government lead with 
contractor support at the ATC body armor test ranges. This arrangement, although 
contentious at times, has proven to be very effective. ATC and the PEO Soldier test 
oversight element have collaborated extensively on quality control and quality assurance 
processes that have yielded continuous improvement.  
The biggest challenge will be maintaining the expertise and institutional 
knowledge gained over more than half a decade, as the Army faces fiscal challenges. 
Continuous training and attention to detail are critical to continued success.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
During the course of this research, it became apparent that some of the topics 
relating to this effort could easily be the topics of individual research projects, which 
presented a challenge in terms of scope. The research was not intended to delve into 
every issue, but to provide an overview of how decisions were made, the impacts from 
those changes, and larger issues for the current and future leadership to consider moving 
forward in an increasingly dangerous and unstable security environment. 
The most important lesson to take away from this research is never to 
underestimate the impact that one unscrupulous vendor can have on the Army and 
industry. Again, this statement remains as true today as it did then, “For as long as 
American Soldiers will go in harm’s way, the Army should get in front of the certain bow 
wave of press reports finding fault with acquisition of these items” (Sahlin, 2010, p. 6). 
Perspective matters. Some in the test community may disagree with the analysis 
and conclusions. That is understandable, as it was a difficult mission for testers, and their 
efforts should be recognized. However, no one has all the answers. This situation 
highlights the need for and importance of a truly collaborative test integrated product 
team. The PDM test might have been more successful had the PEO Soldier personnel 
experienced in body armor test been allowed to participate in the preparation and 
execution of the test.  
Ultimately, the Army needs to ask what has really been accomplished by the 
changes made to body armor testing since June 6, 2007? The metric should be whether 
Soldiers are better protected now, as a result of the test changes, than they were before. It 
is an interesting question, given that no Soldier was killed due to a failure of body armor 
to protect against a threat it was certified to defeat prior to the changes being 
implemented (House Armed Services Committee, 2007, p. 57). 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated previously, many topics are worthy of additional research, but beyond 
the scope of this effort. However, one in particular should be considered for additional 
research. 
The impact of changes to test on the body armor industrial base should be given 
serious consideration. A Hard Armor Industrial Capability Assessment was completed on 
behalf of PEO Soldier in January 2010. The results of this study are not cleared for 
release outside the government, but it is recommended that the results of that study be re-
examined to determine if changes to test protocols (beyond the scope of this research) 
have negatively impacted the industrial base. It should include the potential risk incurred 
by vendors conducting research and development (R&D) testing at NIJ-certified labs 
versus ATC due to cost, and potential issues with DOD financial management policies 
regarding competition with commercial facilities in providing services to private parties 
and agencies outside the federal government.  
One of the subsidiary research questions that was not answered in the conduct of 
this research is: 
 What was the cost of FAT and LAT testing at the NIJ laboratories
compared to the cost of testing at ATEC?
Cost estimates from both ATC and H. P. White were reviewed for both FATs and 
LATs. Due to a lack of detail in some of the estimates, it was difficult to ensure a fair 
comparison. The best source found during the research was a December 2009 
information paper on Test Cost and Schedule Increase at ATC, prepared by PM Soldier 
Protective Equipment (PdM SPE) and approved by the PM Soldier Protective and 
Individual Equipment (PM SPIE). This information paper cited the cost 
of testing at ATC as double that of the NIJ-certified labs (Rickey, 2009). At the time of 
publication of this joint applied project, however, the relevance of this question for other 
than historical documentation appears doubtful. 
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APPENDIX A.  
The PM SEQ Briefing on May 2006 Evaluation of Dragon Skin came from the 
following link, http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/files/dragon_skin_release_000121 
may07.pdf. Reproduced by permission of Program Executive Office Solder, granted 

















































































































































































































APPENDIX B.  
Dean G. Popps memo retrieved from the author’s own professional work archives 
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